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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Corporations-Settlement of Stockholders' Derivative ActionsRes Judicata
A stockholders' derivative suit was brought in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia subsequent to the commencement of
a similar action on the same issues by other stockholders in a New York
state court. The plaintiffs in both actions were minority shareholders
who were bringing suit on behalf of the corporation against the majority
shareholders. In both actions it was alleged that the majority shareholders had doninated the corporation causing it to purchase assets of
two other corporations at excessive prices. The federal court in Reiter
v. Universal Marion Corp.' granted the defendants' motion for a stay
of proceedings pending the outcome of the state action wherein a pro 7
posed settlement was before the New York court for approval. 2 The
plaintiffs were given leave to move to vacate the stay if the proceedings
in the New York court were not prosecuted with due diligence.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power in every
court to control the disposition of cases on its docket to economize time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. 3 It is a well established rule, however, that the mere pendency of a state action involving
the same parties and the same subject matter does not as a matter of
right entitle the defendant to a stay of similar proceedings subsequent.ky
brought in a federal court.4 The determination of whether or not such
a stay should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court
judge.5 Exactly when the exercise of discretion in favor of granting
a stay is called for is not susceptible to any clear-cut lines of demarcation
as a matter of law. In certain situations involving stockholders' derivative actions, both state6 and federal 7 courts have granted stays which
1173 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1959).
2In an earlier case motion by defendants for a stay of proceeding in the federal
court pending the outcome of the New York action had been denied by the federal
district court, but the court here thought that there had been substantial change in
circumstances since that decision. The change in circumstances referred to included the facts that a hearing on the fairness of the compromise had been held
before a New York referee subsquent to the previous motion in the federal hearing,
and that an order from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denying
the prior motion had disavowed any implication in its ruling that the New York
stipulation of settlement did not cover the entire controversy.
'Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
'Amy v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 163 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 266 F.2d 869 (1959).
'Levy v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Kanen Soap Prods.
Co. v. Struthers Wells Corp., 159 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Brendle v.
Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
'Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier,'308 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1957) ; Shanik v.
Aller, 52 N,Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Milvy v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S.2d 881
(Sup. Ct: 1939).
7 Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Schreiber v. Jacobs, 121
F. Supp. 6f0 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp.
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Ratner
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were dependent upon the disposition of another suit in a state or federal
court. In such a case the party applying for the stay must always
make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go
forward with the action.8 Generally, the objection to multiple actions
has been that they are very expensive and harassing for the defendant
who must fight his battle on several fronts. In cases where the stay
has been granted the following conditions were present: (1) the defendants in both actions were substantially identical, (2) the subject
matter of the suits was the same, and (3) the disposition of one suit
would finally determine all of the questions in the other action.
It becomes important, therefore, to examine the conditions in the
principal case which motivated the court to exercise its discretion in favor
of the proposed stay. In addition to the fact that the two actions sought
substantially the same relief on the same issues for the same corporation,
these conditions were: (1) all individual defendants against whom a
money judgment was sought were before the New York court, but the
federal court had not secured jurisdiction over the principal defendants,
(2) the New York action was brought first, hearing on the merits had
already been held, and the referee was about to render a report to the
court on the fairness of the proposed settlement, (3) settlement of the
stockholders' derivative suit in New York would not be accomplished
without first being approved by the New York Court. These factors
weighed heavily in favor of allowing the stay, especially since there
was a probability of a speedy determination of the New York action.
Also the plaintiffs appear to have advanced no valid argument that they
would be prejudiced or irreparably harmed if the stay were granted. The
principal case appears to have reached a desirable result in that it saves
expense to the litigants and avoids unnecessary consumption of time
in court without depriving shareholders of any substantial rights.
The language of the principal case intimated that if the proposed settlement had not been subject to approval in the state court, then the stay
would not have been granted. 9 The court stated, however, that an approved settlement of the state action would be res judicata to all other actions involving the same issues. Thus, the court indicates that it would
give the same effect to a court-approved settlement as it would to a final
judgment on the merits of the cause. In the absence of fraud or collusion of the parties, a judgment on the merits rendered by a court in a
stockholders' derivative action is res judicata against both the corporav. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Schwartz v.
Kaufman,
46 F. Supp. 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
8
Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (dictum).
173 F. Supp. at 15.
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tion and other stockholders in any subsequent suit on the same corporate
cause of action.10
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' and a New York Supreme
Court' 2 have held court-approved settlements in form of judgments to be

res judicata. Stella v. Kaiser'3 involved the effect on a subsequent case
of a settlement decree in a stockholders' derivative suit entered by a federal court. The Court of Appeals stated that a member of the class of
stockholders in a derivative suit is bound by and must accept a judicially
approved compromise in his behalf. 14 In a leading New York case,
Gerith Realty Corp. v. Norntandie Nat'l Sec. Corp.,15 a stockholders'
derivative action was brought on the same issues which had been compromised in open court before judgment in an earlier suit. The settlement was held to be binding on the corporation and on all persons having
the capacity to sue in the corporation's behalf whether or not they had
received notice of the settlement proposal.' 6
Under the New York rules of practice the court, as a matter of discretion, may require its approval of any settlement in a derivative action
which terminates the corporate right of action.' 7 The court also may
appoint a referee to inquire into the fairness of the compromise i8 or seek
the vote of the other stockholders. 19 Under Rule 23(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is mandatory that the settlement be submitted for court approval.2 0
Approval of the settlement is always discretionary, but the court
must consider all available facts and any objections of other stockholders. 21 Notice of the impending settlement 22 should be given to the

' 0 Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916) ; Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
42 (N.D. Iowa 1946); Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Rys. & Union Stockyards
Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 281 (1892); 13 FLETCHER, Cyc. CORPS. § 6043 (perm.
ed. 1943) ; STEVENs, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 173 (1949).
Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954).
Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 276 N.Y. Supp. 655
' Gerith Realty
(Sup. Ct. 1933).
1 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954).
" Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954). However, in this case, the
plaintiff had been a participant in the first action. In a strong dictum the court
stated that even without plaintiff's participation in the prior action, he would be
bound by the previous action because it was a conclusive adjudication of a trueclass action.
"276 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 1007 (1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183 (1935).
" Ibid.

" N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 8; Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp.,
215 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
18 Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397
" Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 276 N.Y. Supp. 655
(Sup. Ct 1933) ; BALLENTINE, CoR'oRAmioxs § 155 (1946).
2
Robbins v. Sperry Corp., 1 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The court so ruled
even as to a dismissal of some of the defendants, with the action still pending as to
others.
2324 (1948).
MOORE, FmERAL PRAcnicE
22
Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L.
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shareholders in every case because the right or duty involved belongs to
them, and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure notice must be
given in compromise settlements of all true class actions. 24 In New York
the court apparently has the discretion as to whether or not notice is to be
given to other stockholders before the settlement is approved. 2
Under both New York and federal decisions the proceeds of a derivative action belong to the corporation ;2 6 certainly such proceeds should
not be retained to the plaintiff's individual use, as opposed to the
corporation's use, whether realized by judgment, court-approved settlement, or private settlement.
In New York the courts have recognized the power in the plaintiff
to discontinue or privately settle his suit at any time before judgment
or before intervention by another stockholder. 27 Other shareholders,
however, may intervene at will and divest the original plaintiff of his
dominion over the suit.28 Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure private settlements of stockholders' derivative suits are not
allowed in federal controversies. Eleven states have adopted rules similar to Rule 23 ;29 however, North Carolina has not done so.
REv. 1, 21 (1947).

"The notice . . . usually advises the stockholder: that one or
more derivative suits are pending on behalf of his corporation; that a settlement
has been proposed and that a copy of the settlement offer is annexed; that the court
has set a date for a hearing to determine whether the offer should be accepted;
that the court has directed that all stockholders of record be given notice by mail
and ordered to show cause at such hearing why the settlement should not be accepted and approved by the court as fair and reasonable; that the pleadings, examinations before trial, minutes of the trial to date, and all papers in the litigation
may be examined at the office of the county clerk or at the offices of the general
counsel for the plaintiffs.
Annexed to the notice is usually a complete copy of the offer addressed to the
corporation and plaintiff's counsel. The offer states what the defendants are willing
to pay or do in exchange for a termination of the suit and for releases to
them . . . "
2 See note 22 supra.
24 FED. R. Crv. P. 73. "Rule 23(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
classifies the shareholders' derivative suit as a species of 'true' class suit which
is defined to be an action where the interest of the members of a class is joint,
common, or secondary (derivative) and where the members are so numerous that
it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . ." LATrN &
JENNINGS,
CASES & MATE.RIALS ON CoRoRAIoNs 738 (1959).
22
N.Y.R. Civ. PRac. 8.
2Klein v. Klein's Outlet, Inc., 160 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1947); Clark v. Greenberg,2 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
" Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y.
Supp.8 360 (1934) ; Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885).
Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, supra note 27 (dictum); 13
FLETCHER, Cyc. CORPS. § 6001 (perm. ed. 1943).
29
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule 23(c) (1956); DEL. CODE ANN.,
RULES OF CoURT OF CHANCERY, Rule 23(c) (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1
(Smith-Hurd 1956) ; IowA CODE ANN., R. Crv. PRoc., Rule 45 (1951) ; Ky. RFv.
STAT., R. CIrv. PROc., Rule 23.02 (1959); NEv. REv. STAT., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule
23(c) (1959) ; N.M. STAT. § 21-1-1, Rule 23(c) (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
R. CIV. PRoc. 2230(b) (1951); TEx. R. CIV. Psoc., Rule 42(b) (1954); UTAH
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In jurisdictions that allow private settlements, "whereby individual
plaintiffs settle out of court, such settlements are not res judicata as to
other stockholders. A voluntary discontinuance of a derivative action in
this manner would not bar a subsequent suit by other stockholders;
however, once a derivative suit is voluntarily discontinued, the same
suit may not be revived by a motion in the cause.30 This rule against
revival was applied in Manufacturer'sMut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson,31
where the New York court refused to reopen a stockholders' suit which
had been privately settled by purchase of the complainant's stock at
seven times the market value with funds of the corporation on whose
behalf the suit had been brought. Although the court stated that the
termination under these circumstances would not bar a new suit by the
corporation, in such a case it may be that the statute of limitations has
32
run.
Settlements, as a compromise to litigation, are generally encouraged
in order to reduce the administrative burdens and expense to the courts
and litigants. The requirement of court approval brings a proposed
settlement out in the open where its fairness may be compared with
the results that might be secured should the case proceed to trial. Generally court approval of these settlements is given by way of a final
decree or judgment;33 however, the effect of an approved settlement
when not rendered in this official form, e.g., the mere notation of the
court's approval upon the record, is uncertain. A recommended method
of clearly resolving questions of law in this area is the enactment of
legislation similar to federal rule 23 but broader in scope. Such legislation should prohibit discontinuance, settlement, or compromise without
court approval, and provide for the finality of court approved settlements,
as well as specify the form in which such approval is to be rendered.
ROBERT N. RANDALL

Covenants Not To Compete
Covenants not to compete are most commonly found in contracts for
the sale of a business or in contracts of employment and have as their
CODE ANN., R. Civ. PROC., Rule 23(c) (1953); Wyo. STAT., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule
23(c) (1959).
'0See generally STEVENS, PRIVATE COR'ORATIONS § 173 (1949).
3125 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d
139 (1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 688, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
"Ibid.; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure it Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
42 CoLum. L. REv. 574, 583 (1942).
"Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Gerith Realty Corp. v.
Normandie Nat'l See. Corp., 215 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 173 F. Supp. 13, 15 (1959) (dictum).

